Conclusion The evidence suggests that domino theory was indeed very influential on US policy towards Indochina during the Cold War but that it was not overwhelmingly so. Interviews with Administration experts and interviews conducted by New York Times correspondents overseas show that even in those few countries where leaders feel that American credibility has been somewhat impaired by Congressional reluctance to provide more military aid to Indochina, there are no signs of a basic reassessment of policy toward the United States.
This has been referred to as a "reverse domino theory,"  or a "democratic domino theory,"  so called because its effects are considered positive, not negative, by Western democratic states.
Most of the major architects of the containment policy that lead to Vietnam--George Kennan, McGeorge Bundy, Robert MacNamara--have unequivocally admitted they were wrong about the Vietnam war.
One Doonesbury cartoon of the period showed a North Vietnamese soldier hiding in a rice paddy as plane fly overhead.
In Thailand, officials who were interviewed said that the Thais were reluctant to sever their connection with Washington completely because they did not see anyone else able to provide them with protection.
The presence of communists in Indochina was the official reason for involvement but during this period the futures of France, Britain and Japan were also very influential Walker, Britain and France were strong allies of the US and were no longer requesting American involvement in the area.
Many members of Congress feel that the resort to the domino image by Mr. Interviews with officials in Japan, Australia and leading nations of Western Europe showed no evidence of a rethinking of relations with Washington.
The invasion revived student protest, and in a famous incident four students were killed at Kent State University in Ohio, when Ohio National Guard troops opened fire on unarmed protesters. As the situation stood inHo Chi Mihn had widespread support everywhere in Vietnam, but was strongest in the North.
Britain and France portrayed themselves as necessary for European security and as essential trading partners, forcing the US to sacrifice its anti-colonial ideals in return for more material advantage Immerman: 3, 7; Walker,